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Abstract  
Understanding which energy future configurations provide publically acceptable levels of energy 
security, affordability, and environmental protection is critical for institutional decision-making. 
However, little is known about how scenarios influence energy preferences. Here we present 
nationally representative UK data on public preferences for energy futures using the my2050 
scenario-building tool that engages people to consider the holistic complexities of system change. 
Engagement with the tool strengthened existing preferences for renewable energy and intentions to 
take personal action. Importantly, patterns of energy preferences were influenced by exemplar 
scenarios, which served as reference points that anchored choices. Carbon capture and storage, 
nuclear power, biofuels, and changes to heating and travel were particularly impacted by scenarios 
indicating uncertainty and ambivalence regarding these options. Scenarios (and scenario-building 
tools) are valuable for engaging citizens about future energy systems. However, care is required in 
their design and interpretation to reach robust conclusions about underlying preferences and 
acceptance. 
 
 
  
3 
 
Numerous countries across the world are currently planning system-wide energy transitions in 
order to address climate change while also maintaining reliable energy supplies (e.g. 1). In the UK the 
2008 Climate Change Act commits the country to an 80% cut in its territorial emissions by the year 
2050 as compared to 1990 levels (2). Developing a national pathway to achieve such system change, 
by exploring different potential future energy scenarios, is therefore important in determining energy 
policy. This is an inherently complex task and the focus of much academic and political scrutiny (e.g. 
3-8). Most such national energy scenarios and policies derive from technical and economic 
assessments and evaluations, but struggle to consider other types of relevant societal values and 
interests (9-13). In this regard, public perspectives can provide insights into potential social 
opportunities and constraints of energy pathways, and in particular which aspects and configurations 
of system change will provide socially acceptable levels of energy security, affordability, and 
environmental protection. Considering public views in this way is also important because energy 
transitions as a whole will involve people and communities in multiple ways – from consumers 
deciding how they should use the services that energy provides, to the ways in which society as a 
whole grants energy system providers a social license to operate (14-15). While there exists a wealth 
of evidence reporting public views of individual supply-side technologies and infrastructure, or on 
particular aspects of energy demand-side change (e.g. 16-19), there is little research that meaningfully 
engages people with the complexities of system change as a whole (although see 20-26). 
Many organisations across diverse sectors invest resources in developing and publishing their 
own scenarios to guide debates and decision-making about energy futures (e.g. 4, 8, 27-28). However, 
tools for engaging members of the public to develop their own scenarios for system change are only 
just emerging. Here we demonstrate how a scenario-building tool can be used to give insights into 
public views. We report a study eliciting nationally representative data using the ‘my2050’ energy 
futures tool first developed by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the 
Sciencewise-Expert Centre for Public Dialogue in Science and Innovation (see Figure 1). The 
my2050 tool represents a simplified version of the UK energy system (4, 29-30). It enables 
respondents to explore different energy futures to meet the UK’s 2050 carbon target of an 80% cut in 
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emissions by adjusting seven supply-side and seven demand-side levers each with four ‘effort’ levels 
(see Methods, Figure 1 and Supplementary Table 1 for details about the levers).  
A particular strength of my2050 is its system-wide approach, whereby users are encouraged 
to explore their preferences about different supply and demand sectors in combination rather than in 
isolation from one another; as well as in the context of carbon targets and technical feasibility. This is 
significant because previous research has repeatedly observed the importance of context in 
influencing public support for, and opposition to, energy technologies and options (6, 24, 31). As 
such, this approach focuses directly on the compromises and value trade-offs often implicit within the 
complex set of issues related to energy futures. This should elicit public preferences which are more 
robust, stable and realistic when compared to those elicited in isolation of wider system contexts and 
information (e.g. most attitude surveys).  
While interactive scenario tools and my2050 in particular have important advantages, the 
assumptions that they make should not be viewed uncritically (29, 32). These tools also have the 
potential to restrict a participant’s exploration and choices because they simplify what are in reality a 
set of highly complex technical, economic and social policy issues (additional commentary on the use 
of my2050 to engage members of the public are articulated in ref 14 and Supplementary Note 1). 
Furthermore, framing theory and research has long pointed to the ways in which the context and 
presentation of information will influence how concepts and ideas are perceived and evaluated (33). 
Within this wider literature, the influence of provided information as reference points (ideas or 
information that is used to compare or understand subsequent information) is of particular interest to 
the current study. We explore the effect of presenting exemplar starting scenarios within my2050, 
examining if people’s final preferences as a result of using the tool differ when presented with 
example energy futures as compared to creating their own future without such examples. This is a 
form of framing relevant beyond the my2050 tool because exemplar scenarios are used routinely in 
decision-making around energy futures (e.g. 4, 7) 
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Specifically, we hypothesised that people might use the presented exemplar scenarios as 
reference points from which to explore their own preferences and values, and that the depiction of 
possible energy futures anchor people’s subsequent evaluations. As such, we predicted that exemplar 
scenarios would significantly influence the energy futures people create using the my2050 tool. Here 
we are drawing on theory on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, which describes how people use 
information that has been provided as a starting (or reference) point and often do not adjust their 
judgements significantly away from this initial frame (34-35). The effect of such reference points has 
been found to be particularly pronounced when people make choices that are complex, unfamiliar or 
uncertain (36-38).  
In the following, we therefore present energy future preferences elicited using the my2050 
tool and go on to explore the effects of using the tool. Our results demonstrate how exemplar 
scenarios can significantly influence people’s choices and how the process of engagement overall can 
strengthen existing preferences.  
 
Public preferences for energy futures using my2050 
We utilised the my2050 tool alongside a survey of public perceptions of energy futures using 
a quota sample (n = 1,800) drawn from Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) and collected 
online in August 2012. The sample is broadly nationally representative with regards to age, gender, 
employment status and geographic region. Figure 2 displays means and standard deviations of lever 
choices in the basic my2050 tool (referred to as ‘no exemplar’ condition). Figure 3a presents the 
percentage of our sample selecting each lever position in order to achieve the carbon reduction target. 
Aspects of carbon reduction that were particularly important to our sample appear to be demand-side 
efficiency measures within the home and the business sector, both of which received the highest 
effort, followed by renewable energy (solar, marine, hydro) and offshore wind options on the supply-
side. Biofuels also played a significant part in these public pathways, although this finding needs to be 
interpreted with caution because it is difficult to reach the carbon target using my2050 without 
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including at least some biofuels. The options that received the least effort on average included 
reductions in manufacturing growth and home temperature, alongside nuclear power, and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS; described in the tool as ‘clean coal and gas’). 
 
Figure 1 depicts the energy future based on modal responses for illustrative purposes. 
However, note that the interpretation of this modal ‘public pathway’ is based on the most frequently 
chosen lever positions, resulting in quite a balanced pathway for meeting the carbon target. This 
pathway includes high levels of renewable energy on the supply side and high levels of energy 
efficiency on the demand side (although in this future supply significantly exceeds demand). This 
however hides several key aspects of the data, and most importantly its variability. For example, 
several levers were associated with a spread in responses illustrated by the high standard deviations 
shown in Figure 2: specifically nuclear power, CCS, onshore wind, biofuels, and reducing home 
temperatures. At the other extreme little variability is evident for fossil fuels, with most participants 
including substantial reductions in fossil fuel use in their my2050 futures (note it is possible to meet 
the carbon target without making any effort on fossil fuels, but only about 1% of respondents did so).  
 
Framing preferences using exemplar scenarios 
Much information in the public domain on potential future energy pathways comes in the 
form of pre-defined scenarios (e.g. 4, 27-28). We therefore examined the effects of providing 
exemplar scenarios to people and whether they might act as reference points anchoring the final 
futures that people arrived at. Within the study we presented two commonly discussed future energy 
scenarios to additional sub-samples of our respondents. These sub-samples were also broadly 
nationally representative (see Methods).  
The first exemplar was constructed to represent a ‘high-technology future’ and relied heavily 
on non-renewable low-carbon supply technologies to meet the carbon reduction target, particularly 
high levels of CCS and nuclear power (n=204). The second represented a ‘low-carbon living future’ 
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and depicted a pathway where much of the effort relied on demand-side change, alongside high use of 
wind and other renewable energy sources (n=210). For each sub-sample of respondents the supply and 
demand levers in the tool were first set to represent one of these futures (see Methods for exact 
starting positions of each lever) and they then had to adjust these lever positions according to their 
own preferences. This is in contrast to the original ‘no exemplar’ version of the tool where all levers 
were initially set to zero (defined as minimal effort/ no change from current trajectory).  
We compared the lever choices of the two exemplar scenario conditions with the no exemplar 
condition using a series of parametric and non-parametric tests (see Method). The average lever 
choices for each condition are displayed alongside each other in Figure 2 (also see Supplementary 
Table 2 for full descriptive statistics). Figure 3b and c display the percentage of respondents selecting 
each lever position for the two exemplar scenario conditions.  
Examining the average pathways across the three scenario conditions, two aspects are of note. 
First, differences between the average choices are clearly evident, with most levers showing 
differences across the three versions of the tool. Indeed, a multivariate analysis of variance test was 
found to be significant (F(28, 4398)=4396,p<0.05) indicating that the scenarios we presented to 
affected participants’ choices. Furthermore, follow-up tests (analysis of variance and post-hoc t-tests 
with Bonferroni corrections; Supplementary Table 3) revealed significant differences across all three 
versions of the tool for almost all levers (see Figure 2). There was one clear exception: the reductions 
in manufacturing growth option was not found to be different across the three versions of the tool. 
The most common response was a low ‘effort’ level of 1, corresponding to no change in 
manufacturing output (as opposed to an increase at level 0 and a decrease at levels 2 and 3; also see 
Supplementary Note 1).  To confirm the findings from the parametric analysis, a series of non-
parametric tests were also conducted in the form of Mann-Whitney U tests (full results displayed in 
Supplementary Table 4). Here we find that onshore wind also showed no significant difference 
between the no exemplar and exemplar conditions. Levels included tended to indicate some support 
for onshore wind turbines, but less than for other renewable technologies. 
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Second, and perhaps most critically, those differences evident between the no exemplar and 
exemplar versions of the tool were in the direction of the original starting points that respondents were 
presented with, clearly illustrating the effect of anchoring. For the ‘high-technology future’ we 
observed significantly higher levels of biofuels, nuclear power and CCS, coupled with lower effort for 
renewables and most demand-side choices. For the ‘low-carbon living’ scenario, we found 
significantly lower effort for non-renewable forms of supply and significantly higher effort on all 
renewable forms apart from onshore wind when compared to the other two conditions. Similarly, we 
found significantly higher inclusion of all demand-side options in the ‘low-carbon living’ condition, 
apart from reductions in manufacturing growth (low in all versions) and business greenness (high in 
all versions).  
A number of commonalities can also be observed between the three versions when examining 
the pattern of responses as a whole and the variability of lever choices. Respondents in all conditions 
included relatively high levels of offshore wind, renewables and energy efficiency: indicating robust 
preferences (under different frames) and therefore strong generic support for these options. This is 
even the case in the ‘high-technology’ condition, which illustrates an energy future that effectively 
meets the carbon target without renewable technologies. Despite this initial framing, respondents still 
chose to include high levels of renewables in this condition. A corollary of this is that people are 
likely to be more prone to anchoring and reference point effects if prior preferences are less strongly 
held. Hence more variability is observed across the three conditions for other supply-side 
technologies, specifically CCS, nuclear power and biofuels, indicating less consistent preferences for 
these more controversial technologies. Responses here were clearly impacted by the differing starting 
scenarios, indicating a significant degree of uncertainty or ambivalence. Nuclear power, however, 
tended to be included least compared to other supply technologies irrespective of its absolute level.  
Examining the demand-side, manufacturing growth and home temperature reductions were 
typically included at levels reflecting a reluctance to change both of these from current energy use 
patterns (although some variability in home temperature reductions was observed, whereby some 
people included greater reductions in the ‘low-carbon living’ condition). Other changes (e.g. changing 
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heating fuel, and the way we travel) were generally included at levels that indicate acceptance of some 
lifestyle changes (e.g. increased use of public transport and electric vehicles), and again they were 
significantly impacted by the starting scenario.  
Taken together, several clear public preferences with regard to energy futures emerged across 
all versions of the my2050 tool, despite framing in the form of anchoring being present. Nonetheless, 
we did also find significant framing effects. One potential explanation is that giving people examples 
of potential solutions – in this case energy futures that meet the carbon target – results in less vigorous 
reflection by the users on the available options and on their own personal preferences. In addition, 
people might be particularly prone to using existing information as anchor points for options where 
high ambivalence, uncertainty or unfamiliarity is being experienced. Here variability across 
conditions with regard to some options might reflect weaker, or not yet fully formed preferences, 
making them particularly susceptible to framing effects (36). One feature of our data that supports this 
suggestion comes from the time respondents spent engaging with the tool. On average, respondents 
spent more time engaged in the no exemplar condition compared to the two exemplar scenario 
conditions (full analysis detail in Supplementary Note 2, Supplementary Figure 1 and Supplementary 
Table 5). Although people, on average, did spend substantial time engaging with the tool in all 
versions (approximately 9 to 12.5 minutes), this difference indicates that providing exemplar 
scenarios can lead to less time spent interrogating and reflecting on choices. However, it is also worth 
noting that, when comparing respondents’ rated happiness with their created futures, no significant 
differences were found across the three versions (F(2, 1561)=1.226, p>0.05; the average response 
across all versions being ‘fairly happy’). 
 
Effects of engaging with the my2050 tool 
Finally, we were interested in what effect engaging with the my2050 tool might have on 
people’s more general perceptions of energy supply options and the need for demand-side change. We 
therefore compared relevant perceptions before and after engagement with the tool. Despite the strong 
climate change emphasis within my2050, we found that concern for climate change was not 
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significantly different before (M=2.89, SD=0.82) compared to after using the tool (M=2.90, SD=0.81; 
F(1, 2180)=0.115, p>0.05). Similarly, concern for energy security issues was unaffected (before 
M=3.17 SD=0.59, after M=3.15 SD=0.58; F(1, 1927)=1.873, p>0.05). Although we note here that 
concern for both climate change and energy security was high in all samples.  
Perceptions of the need for demand-side change and the favourability of energy sources were 
however impacted (see Supplementary Note 3 and Supplementary Table 6 for full analysis detail). 
People’s preparedness to reduce their own energy use showed a small but significant increase after 
engaging with the tool. With regard to different energy sources for electricity generation, a clear 
pattern emerged whereby people generally became slightly less favourable towards fossil fuels and 
more favourable towards renewable energy options. The analysis of variance test did not indicate any 
significant interaction between perceptions (before and after) and the three versions of the tool 
(original, high-technology, low-carbon living), indicating that the three versions did not impact 
preferences differently. This latter finding suggests that engagement with a scenario-building tool like 
my2050 may indeed increase certainty in people’s choices and heighten the perceived need for action. 
We did not explore the mechanisms by which this might occur here, however it is likely that such 
engagement consolidates and confirms people’s existing preferences while also making the 
implications and need for action more salient. 
 
Discussion 
Our study illustrates how scenario-building tools such as my2050 can be useful for gauging 
public preferences towards ‘whole’ energy system change, and eliciting views about energy choices in 
the context of each other and within the constraints set by carbon-targets and technical feasibility. The 
importance of doing this has been recognized previously (39), but the current study is the first to offer 
systematic research evidence showing how it can be successfully achieved. 
Public preferences elicited through the my2050 tool are consistent with analyses of public 
preferences from other data (40-41). However, unlike the analysis reported by a previous study, which 
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examined responses by a sample of self-selected respondents who accessed the tool online at its 
launch in 2011 (29), we did not find a preference for demand-side over supply-side changes. This 
might be due to the sample in this previous analysis being self-selected, potentially more engaged 
with environmental issues in advance, and hence also more inclined to accept aspects of personal 
change when using the tool. 
In our analysis, strong public preferences exist for the inclusion of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency within energy futures, whereas reductions in manufacturing growth (and to some 
extent home temperature) were clearly avoided. One possible explanation for this latter finding is that 
manufacturing may be closely linked to economic prosperity in people’s minds (9). In contrast, much 
more variability in preferences was observed for options that previous literature has found to be more 
unfamiliar to people, and these elicited more ambivalent preferences (such as CCS or biofuels and 
electric cars, 39-42). As such, when preferences are not fully formed or strong, they are also more 
susceptible to being influenced by the context in which they are elicited (36). 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this study is the observation of framing effects, in the 
form of anchoring. We found that people’s choices were significantly influenced by the exemplar 
scenarios presented to them. It is therefore possible that presenting existing scenarios to people might 
lead to lower critical engagement with options embedded in a scenario, especially if uncertainty or 
ambivalence already exists around those options. This observation is relevant beyond the my2050 
tool, holding implications for any processes that seek to engage the public and stakeholders in 
decision-making around energy systems and strategies. In particular, responses to exemplar scenarios 
and scenario-building tools must be interpreted with caution when attempting to draw conclusions 
about underlying preferences and acceptance. One way to ensure a more robust analysis of public (or 
other stakeholder) perspectives would be to use multiple contrasting scenarios, in order to 
demonstrate where preferences are robust or, alternatively, where they are particularly prone to 
framing effects. This would also ensure engagement with a range of potential futures. There is 
evidence that such a practice has, in part, been adopted by the wider 2050 pathway project; for 
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example the more complicated 2050 calculator (on which my2050 was based) includes a range of 
exemplar pathways suggested by government and third parties (43). 
Finally, the my2050 tool enables people to explore their visions and preferences for system-
wide energy transitions at the country level. Although it does so in a more realistic setting to many 
other previous approaches, and seems to engage people meaningfully, simply engaging with the tool 
does not necessarily indicate willingness to accept certain options (which is often context dependent) 
or to change current practices and behaviours. It can, however, reveal areas of conflict (e.g., extensive 
use of biofuels) and opportunities for change (e.g. responses to efficiency initiatives). It will therefore 
be important to integrate findings obtained from this and other tools with complementary approaches 
to understanding public perspectives. These conversations, and associated research, are important if 
society more widely is to have an effective voice in decisions about what type of future energy 
transition is both desirable and achievable. 
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Methods 
The survey and my2050 tool  
 A national survey instrument was developed by Cardiff University to examine public 
perceptions of the UK energy system and its future development. Data were collected online for this 
quantitative survey from 2-12 August 2012 by the professional survey company Ipsos MORI. For all 
participants, consent was obtained prior to taking part and the study was approved by the relevant 
University ethics committee. The questionnaire included questions on perceptions of key issues 
germane to energy system change and energy futures, including views on: policy framings such as 
climate change, energy security, and affordability; key energy supply options including fossil fuels, 
nuclear power, and wind energy; electrification of cooking, driving, and heating; demand reduction 
and demand side management issues; and overall system change. After completion of this 
questionnaire, respondents were asked to create their own energy future using the my2050 tool.  
The my2050 tool is based on a more complicated calculator also available publically (43). 
This has been an influential development in the UK and elsewhere with similar tools now taken up in 
over 18 countries (e.g., Australia, Taiwan, Bangladesh, South Africa and many European countries; 
44). Both the my2050 tool and the more complicated calculator have undergone various changes in 
recent years, although these changes have been more pronounced for the calculator rather than the 
my2050 tool. In the current study we used the original my2050 tool which was launched in March 
2011. Supplementary Table 1 provides more detailed descriptions of each of the 14 levers that make 
up an energy future in my2050. In addition, we refer the reader to (29) who provide a comprehensive 
overview and description of the tool and its background. Further information can also be found on the 
relevant websites: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/2050-pathways-analysis 
 
Before creating their own energy futures, we presented respondents with some basic 
information and instructions, alongside a still image of the my2050 tool: 
The following interactive tool provides a simplified version of the UK energy system. We want you to 
explore this tool and create your vision for the UK energy system in 2050. You can change how we 
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supply our electricity and fuel e.g. how we generate electricity as well as how we use that energy (e.g. 
how we might change our energy usage in our everyday lives). 
 
You should keep two things in mind: 
1. The tool is designed to explore how the UK can change its energy system to meet carbon 
emission targets. Specifically, by 2050 the UK has to reduce CO2 emissions to 20% of 1990 
levels. You need to meet this target to be able to submit your ‘world’ and move to the next 
section of the survey (arrow pointing to the carbon target on image of tool). 
2. You need to make sure that demand does not exceed supply (that is we don’t use more energy 
than we are actually producing). This will be indicated on the tool – to see the indicator you 
need to click on this bar (arrow pointing to energy security indicator on image of tool). 
 
We want you to create a future that you would like to live in whilst being realistic, taking into account 
practicalities and real constraints that you think are important. 
 
The respondents who were assigned to one of the exemplar scenario conditions received an 
additional sentence before moving on to the tool: When you click ‘next’ and move on to the tool, you 
will see that a possible ‘future’ has already been created. This world meets the 20% target primarily 
by changing how we produce our energy (supply)/how we use energy (lifestyle change). Please 
explore this future and change it to create your own vision. 
 
We only made one major change to the tool. In the two versions of the tool in which 
respondents were presented with an exemplar scenario, the starting points of all the levers were set at 
particular points rather than being set at 0. The two exemplar scenarios were created by the 
researchers in conjunction with the scenarios created for the qualitative phase of data collection as 
part of the wider project (41). They represented two different but plausible futures. The first involved 
a highly technological response to energy issues with technologies like CCS and nuclear energy along 
with some renewable energy deployment and only a small amount of change on the demand side. The 
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second exemplar scenario focused on high levels of renewable deployment and higher levels of 
change to the demand side. These were broadly modelled on scenarios available in the public domain, 
for example the 100% renewable energy scenario produced by the Word Wildlife Fund and the 
Blueprints Shell scenario (see 27-28). The exemplar scenarios were created by first adjusting the 
levers to represent key aspects identified to be important in each (either a lot of renewable energy with 
accompanying demand-side changes or high amounts of non-renewable energy supply such as CCS 
and nuclear). Then additional levers were adjusted to ensure the scenarios reached the carbon target 
and sufficient energy security (demand and supply balance).  
The two exemplar scenario conditions are referred to as ‘high-technology’ and ‘low-carbon living’, 
but this label was not presented to participants. The final starting positions for each of the levers in the 
two conditions are as follows: 
For the high-technology exemplar scenario: Biofuels (3), Fossil fuel reduction (1), Nuclear 
power (3), CCS (3), Wind-land (0), Wind-sea (0), Other renewables (0), Manufacturing growth 
(reductions) (1), Business greenness (1), Home efficiency (1), Home temperature reduction (0), 
Heating fuel (1), How we travel (1), Transport fuel (1).  
For the low-carbon living exemplar scenario: Biofuels (1), Fossil fuel reduction (2), Nuclear 
power (0), CCS (0), Wind-land (2), Wind-sea (3), Other renewables (3), Manufacturing growth 
(reductions) (1), Business greenness (2), Home efficiency (3), Home temperature reduction (2), 
Heating fuel (2), How we travel (3), Transport fuel (2). 
 Finally, we made a number of other smaller changes to the appearance of the tool for this 
particular research study. This included removing the background noises and music, and the links to 
Twitter and Facebook. The version original published by the UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change also included a number of screens after the submission of an energy future which summarised 
the respondent’s choices. The text accompanying this summary was replaced with a simple message 
of “Thank you for submitting your world. Your future world looks like this:” Respondents are also 
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asked a number of follow-up questions within the tool itself, from which we removed a question about 
climate change concern (because respondents are asked about this at a later stage). 
Sample  
A nationally-representative quota sample of the British population (i.e., England, Scotland, 
and Wales) aged 18 years and older completed the online survey.  All respondents were taken from 
the Ipsos MORI Access Panel. Panellists were recruited using an email invitation including a link to 
the online questionnaire. The email contained information about the length of survey and incentive 
points. Quotas were monitored on a daily basis during fieldwork and reminder emails were sent to all 
panellists who had not completed the survey. Quotas were set according to key socio-demographic 
variables including gender, geographic region, age, and employment status to ensure broad national 
representation across these. The same quotas were used for the sub-samples recruited to complete the 
two altered versions of the my2050 tool. Quota data were based on Labour Force Survey statistics 
from 2006. Full sample details are available in (40).  
The drop-out rate (22%) was in line with other surveys of this kind (length and topic) and 
evenly distributed across all sections of the survey. Response rates are not indicative when using 
online quota-sampling as non-response cannot be easily defined and demographic information should 
be consulted instead (45). 
The majority of respondents completed the my2050 tool using the original version where each 
respondent created their own energy future to meet the carbon reduction target (n=1,800). The two 
sub-samples (n=204, n=210) which received altered versions of the my2050 tool also contained 
quotas to ensure broad national representation on the demographic variables mentioned previously. 
After completion of the main questionnaire, respondents were randomly allocated to one of the three 
conditions (no exemplar, high-technology exemplar, low-carbon living exemplar) until the required 
sample sizes and quotas were met. There are no major differences on key demographic variables (age, 
gender, occupational status) between the three samples.  
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Analysis 
The my2050 tool enables respondents to create their own energy future using 14 supply and 
demand-side choices in the form of levers. Each lever has four levels where level 0 is referred to as 
‘no effort’ and level 3 is considered ‘highest effort’. High effort levels represent an increase in a 
particular option within the energy system: for example an increase in numbers of wind turbines or 
greater use of public transport. For three levers – fossil fuels, manufacturing growth, home 
temperature – this pattern does not hold. These sliders are moved ‘down’ rather than ‘up’, where low 
‘effort levels’ either represent an increase or no change to that sector and higher ‘effort levels’ 
represent decreases (e.g. lowering of home temperature). For all analyses, ‘no effort’ is assigned 0 and 
‘highest effort’ is assigned as level 3, irrespective of whether the lever is moved down or up within 
the tool. 
 In this paper we chose to analyse the data generated from the my2050 tool in multiple ways. 
In particular we examined differences between the samples completing different versions of the tool 
using both parametric and non-parametric statistical tests. On the one hand, the data could be 
considered ordinal because the labels associated with each point on a particular lever do not represent 
equivalent intervals. In this case non-parametric tests would be most appropriate. On the other hand, 
the spatial differences between each point on the lever are equivalent and it is likely that respondents 
interpreted them as such. We therefore provide multiple descriptive statistics including means, 
medians and modes and conduct the analysis using both parametric (MANOVA and follow-up tests) 
and non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U tests). Results from both types of tests are consistent with 
one another and we note that the overall conclusions do not change depending on the type of test and 
statistic used. The analyses are displayed in full in Supplementary Table 2 (descriptive statistics), 
Supplementary Table 3 and 4 (statistical test results).  
Measures 
The following measures were used to examine the effect of the my2050 tool on respondents’ 
attitudes more broadly: 
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Climate change concern: How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, sometimes referred 
to as ‘global warming’? Higher numbers indicate more concern on a 4-point response scale (not at all 
concerned, not very concerned, fairly concerned, very concerned). 
Energy security concern: A reliable scale (Cronbach’s α (before) = 0.83; (after) = 0.83) was 
created using six questions. How concerned, if at all, are you that in the next 10-20 years: a) 
electricity and gas will become unaffordable for you? b) petrol will become unaffordable for you? c) 
there will be frequent power cuts d) the UK will be too dependent on energy from other countries? e) 
there will be a national petrol shortage? f) the UK will have no alternatives in place (e.g. renewables) 
if fossil fuels (gas, oil) are no longer available? Responses were provided on the same scale as for 
climate change concern.  
Preparedness to reduce own energy use was measured by creating a scale using three items 
(Cronbach’s α (before) = 0.74; (after) = 0.78). I am prepared to greatly reduce my energy use; I am 
prepared to greatly reduce my energy use if support is available to help me do this; I want to reduce 
my energy use. Responses were provided on a 5-point agreement scale where higher numbers indicate 
more agreement (strongly disagree, tend to disagree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to agree, 
strongly agree). 
Favourability towards energy sources: How favourable or unfavourable are your overall 
opinions or impressions of the following energy sources for producing electricity currently? 
Respondents indicated their favourability on a 5-point response scale where higher numbers indicate 
greater favourability (very unfavourable, mainly unfavourable, neither favourable nor unfavourable, 
mainly favourable, very favourable). The question included the following energy sources: Biomass 
(that is wood, energy crops, and human and animal waste), coal, gas, hydroelectric power, nuclear 
power, oil, sun/solar power, wind power, marine power (tidal and wave power). For analysis, 
responses to the three fossil fuel sources were combined to form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α 
(before) = 0.78; (after) = 0.83). The same was done for the renewable energy sources (hydroelectric, 
marine, wind, sun/solar, biomass) Cronbach’s α (before) = 0.73; (after) = 0.74). 
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Happiness with their created my2050 future: How happy are you with the world that you 
created? Responses were provided on a 5-point scale where higher numbers represented greater 
happiness (very unhappy, fairly unhappy, no opinion, fairly happy, very happy). 
Data Availability 
A report of the questionnaire results is available (40). Data that support other findings of this 
study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the my2050 tool. The image depicts an energy future based on modal 
responses for respondents completing the original version of the tool where starting positions of levers 
were set at 0 indicating no change to the current trajectory of that sector (no exemplar scenario 
presented, n=1,800). Note that in this pathway supply exceeds demand by a substantial amount. Image 
contains public sector information licensed under the United Kingdom’s Open Government License 
v2.0.  
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Figure 2. Responses to the my2050 tool. Mean lever/effort level (0=no effort/change to current trajectory; 3=heroic measures to change current trajectory) for 
each of the 14 levers are presented. Error bars indicate ±1 standard deviation. All differences between scenario conditions are significant (F(28, 
4398)=4396,p<0.05) with the exception of manufacturing growth (all three conditions), fossil fuel reduction between the no exemplar and high-technology 
condition, and business greenness between the no exemplar and low-carbon living condition. Non-parametric tests confirm these findings with additional non- 
significant differences for the onshore wind lever comparing the no exemplar condition to both the high-technology and low-carbon living exemplar 
conditions.    
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Figure 3. Responses to the three versions of the my2050 tool. Percentage of respondents at each of 
the four levels (0=no effort/change to current trajectory; 3=heroic measures to change trajectory) for 
the 14 levers are shown. These are ranked by percentage of respondents choosing the top effort 
level/setting. Figure 3a displays responses for the original version of the my2050 tool (no exemplar 
scenario, n=1,800). Figure 3b and 3c display responses to the ‘high-technology’ (n=204) and the 
‘low-carbon living’ (n=210) exemplar scenario conditions respectively.  
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